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Abstract—This document summarizes the experience of Julien
Voisin during the 2011 edition of the well-known Google Summer
of Code. This project is a first step in the domain of metadata
anonymization in Free Software. This article is articulated in
three parts. First, a state of the art and a categorization of
usual metadata, then the privacy policy is exposed/discussed in
order to find the right balance between information lost and
privacy enhancement. Finally, the specification of the Metadata
Anonymization Toolkit (MAT) is presented, and future possible
works are sketched.
Index Terms—Metadata; Anonymization; Digital Forensics;
Anonymity; Privacy; Side Channel Information.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Google Summer of Code (GSoC [1]) is an annual
program organized by Google, to promote the development
of free software: students are paid by Google to work on
open-source projects during the summer break. Julien Voisin,
principal author of this paper, is an undergraduate student in
computer science at the University of Technology of Belfort-
Montbéliard (University of Franche-Comté) who was selected
in the 2011 GSoC session. This article, written under the
supervision of the other authors, summarizes his experiences.
The project was to depersonalize or remove any personal
information embedded in media sent through the Tor net-
work [2]. Tor, which stands for The Onion Router, is a network
of virtual tunnels that allows people and groups to improve
their privacy and security on the Internet. It also enables soft-
ware developers to create new communication tools with built-
in privacy features. Tor provides the foundation for a range of
applications that allow organizations and individuals to share
information over public networks without compromising their
privacy. However, the desired anonymity can be broken by the
data sent through it, if it contains information on the sender.
For instance, metadata is frequently added during several data
acquisition processes, possibly without the user’s knowledge
or consent. Obviously, such information can be problematic
when desiring to reach anonymity on the Internet.
Metadata consists of information that characterizes digital
data like Microsoft Word documents, pictures, music files,
and so on. In essence, metadata does provide an excellent
source of information on every facet of the data that can
be characterized, like who produced the document, when and
where it was produced, for which reasons, what the content
of the media is, and so on. Indeed, metadata within a file
can reveal a lot of things about the author of the document.
For instance, cameras record the date on which any picture has
been taken and which camera has been used. Office documents
like PDF or those produced by LibreOffice/Microsoft Office
automatically add authors and company information into doc-
uments and spreadsheets. Not everybody is willing to disclose
such information on the web.
This paper presents the main achievement of a project
realized by Julien Voisin during his 2011 session of the Google
Summer of Code (GSoC). This project aimed at removing any
personal information embedded in any given media, leading to
the development of a Metadata Anonymization Toolkit (MAT)
library1. In this document, the MAT is presented, and the
necessary choices that have been made during its realization
are documented. For instance, such a tool is supposes to be
able to choose which information to remove. However, to
determine which metadata raises problems for privacy is not
a trivial question. Some metadata is clearly problematic, such
as GPS coordinates, but others are less easy to tell apart (like
the gid (Group IDentifier) giving the group of the file under
consideration). To solve this problem, the following politic has
been chosen: most of the time, the MAT library tries to remove
all metadata that is not mandatory to the file integrity.
The Metadata Anonymization Toolkit is already embedded
in the Tails GNU/Linux distribution [3]. Tails is a live CD
or live USB that aims at preserving the users privacy and
anonymity in a friendly way. More specifically, Tails delivers
the three following services. Firstly, it helps to use the Internet
anonymously, from any location and on any computer: all
connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor
network. Secondly, it leaves no trace on the computer unless
the user asks it explicitly. Lastly, up-to-date cryptographic
tools can be used to encrypt files, emails, and instant mes-
saging. Tails is not the only LiveCD dedicated to privacy.
Incognito [4] was a similar project in all aspects, but based on
Gentoo instead of Debian. The main developer has abandoned
the project to join forces with the Tails team in 2010. JonDo
LiveCD [5] also deserves a mention, although it is more
focused on JonDonym (their home-made anonymity network)
rather than than on Tor and Amnesic features.
The remainder of this student research work is organized
1The MAT is available at https://mat.boum.org and is distributed under the
GPLv2 license. Although it offers a command line interface, the most common
usage is to use it by the mean of its GUI.
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FIELD EXAMPLE
File Name example.jpg
File Modification Date/Time 2012:03:02 16:20:52+01:00
File Type JPEG
MIME Type image/jpeg
JFIF Version 1.02
Orientation Horizontal (normal)
X Resolution 72
Y Resolution 72
Resolution Unit inches
Software Adobe Photoshop CS3 Windows
Modify Date 2009:06:14 21:09:57
Exif Image Width 1984
Exif Image Height 5300
Compression JPEG (old-style)
Thumbnail Offset 332
Thumbnail Length 7172
Current IPTC Digest e8f15cf32fc118a1a27b67adc564d5ba
IPTC Digest e8f15cf32fc118a1a27b67adc564d5ba
Copyright Flag False
Photoshop Thumbnail (Binary data 7172 bytes, use -b option to extract)
Photoshop Quality 5
XMP Toolkit Adobe XMP Core 4.1-c036 46.276720, Mon Feb 19 2007 22:40:08
Creator Tool Adobe Photoshop CS3 Windows
Create Date 2009:06:14 21:09:57+02:00
Metadata Date 2009:06:14 21:09:57+02:00
Document ID uuid:97B34EC31559DE1181FD86CC9CA57AAA
History (empty)
Primary Platform Microsoft Corporation
Image Size 1984x5300
Thumbnail Image (Binary data 7172 bytes, use -b option to extract)
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF METADATA EMBEDDED IN A PICTURE (RECOVERED WITH EXIFTOOL [6])
as follows. In Section II, the metadata under concern is
introduced. Section III presents a short state-of-the-art in
current metadata forensics investigation. Section IV analyses
the different kinds of metadata and proposes to categorize
them. Section VI presents the MAT tool, focusing on the
chosen privacy policy and implemented features, whereas
in Section VII future potential improvements are addressed.
This research work ends by a conclusion section, where the
contribution in the field of anonymity is summarized and
intended future work is presented.
II. METADATA OVERVIEW
A. Presentation
Metadata, also known as data about data, is information
that characterizes or gives details on digital media like music,
images, movies, Office files, etc. There are two kinds of
metadata: structural and descriptive.
On the one hand, structural metadata provides information
about the internal structure of the file. Such information,
which is required to extract the content from the binary
representation, does not change for a given type of file. For
instance, digital cameras insert into each picture they produce:
the date, the camera model, the post-processing software used,
and even, for some high-end models, the GPS coordinates of
the place where the images have been taken! Office documents
like PDF or LibreOffice/Microsoft Office generally contains
authors, operating system, company information, and even the
history of revisions into each document.
On the other hand, descriptive metadata provides unneces-
sary information about the file or the data content. Its reason to
be is to enrich the media with secondary additional information
like comments, creation date, and so on. Obviously, it can
also compromise the anonymity and privacy of users in a
network context, and previous works in the literature show
that such descriptive metadata can allow the authors to be
tracked back [7], [8]. For example, two zip files of the same
size will have the same compressed size metadata, but not
necessarily the same last modification date. More disquieting,
some metadata is hidden [9], [10]: it is added during the
data acquisition stage of the file creation process, possibly
without the user’s knowledge nor agreement. Not everybody
is willing to accept the automatic presence of such information
whose existence or content is not always known or precisely
documented. Examples of such metadata are presented in the
next subsection, whereas in Sect. II-C some well-known case
studies where metadata has helped to find the author of a
document are shown.
B. Example of metadata contents
Table I shows an example of the kind of metadata that can
be found in a given picture. This metadata has been obtained
using Exiftool, a Perl library/CLI application written by Phil
Harvey for reading/writing metadata, that supports many file
types [6]. It is possible to deduce at least the following facts
from these data:
The last file modification of the picture is 2012:03:02,
but the internal metadata shows that the picture has been
modified on 2009:06:14, so the picture may not have been
created as such. The software used is Adobe Photoshop CS3
on Microsoft Windows, this is why there is a Photoshop
thumbnail embedded in the medium. The IPTC digest2 is both
embedded and re-calculated, allowing a simple integrity test
to be performed.
The absence of a copyright flag may indicate that the picture
was not created by a professional. The XMP toolkit is the
metadata normally used by Adobe, and the date corresponds to
the release of Photoshop CS3 (April 2007). The file’s creation
date and that in the metadata are the same, which may indicate
that the picture was created and not modified subsequently.
The document ID allows the tracking of the document. The
absence of history is a little bit unsusual, it cannot help to
establish a precise chronology of the image’s creation timeline.
The primary platform reinforces the hypothese of a Windows
platform. Since the thumbnail also contains its own metadata,
it is an additional vector that may compromises anonymity.
C. Metadata against anonymity: some case studies
Metadata is generally not purposefully inserted in order to
reveal any user’s information to unauthorized observers, it is
embedded with the purpose of enriching the media. Metadata
provides additional features and services, both to the user
and the applications he or she uses. Thus, removing all the
metadata that may potentially lead to personal information
leaks can appear as excessive: to refuse concrete services that
metadata offers for largely hypothetical threats may look un-
reasonable. However, metadata has already been successfully
used to discover the hidden authors of unauthenticated digital
documents published on the Internet, as illustrated by the two
following examples.
In February 2012, a hacker named Higinio (w0rmer) O.
Ochoa III posted a link, on his Twitter account, to a website
disclosing data taken from various law enforcement websites.
On the bottom of the website was a picture of a woman’s
breast with a message destined to mock the authorities (Fig. 1).
Unfortunately for him, the photo was taken from an iPhone,
which embeds GPS coordinates among other metadata. These
coordinates led the police to identify the girl in the picture,
who was the girlfriend of the hacker. He was sentenced to 27
months of prison [11], [12].
Another well-known example of arrest using metadata is
the case of the infamous “BTK serial killer”, namely Dennis
Rader [13]. Some weeks before his arrest, he asked the police
if he could communicate with them using a floppy disk,
without being traced back to a particular computer. The police
answered by posting an advertising in the local newspaper, as
instructed by Rader, saying “Rex, it will be OK”. Some weeks
later, such a disk was received at a local television station.
A forensic analysis (with the EnCase forensic software [14])
revealed an erased Word document that contained the terms
“Christ Lutheran Church”, and that was last modified by
2IPTC is a filestructure/type of metadata, like XMP
“Dennis”. Dennis Rader was the president of the local church
congregation’s council. The BTK had taken efforts to delete
identifying information from the disk, but had printed the
file in his church, because his printer was down. The police
lieutenant Ken Landwehr, head of the multiagency task force
in charge of the case, said that “this clue was a determinant
factor for his arrest. If he had just quit and kept his mouth
shut, we might never have connected the dots.”
A more recent example is the capture of John McAfee,
which was probably made possible with the help of meta-
data forensics. Sought by the justice of Belize for ques-
tioning about the murder of his neighbour, McAfee fled to
Guatemala. He was accompanied by two journalists from
Vice magazine, who took a picture of him during his escape.
Unfortunately for him, they forgot to wipe the metadata :
GPS Altitude : 7.1 m Above Sea Level
GPS Latitude : 15 deg 39’ 29.40" N
GPS Longitude : 88 deg 59’ 31.80" W
GPS Position : 15 deg 39’ 29.40" N,
88 deg 59’ 31.80" W.
Such information probably led to his arrest by the
Guatemalian authorities for entering the country illegally.
Even if these case studies have concerned anonymity dis-
closure of criminals demanded by police officers, everybody
should have in mind that such investigations can be con-
ducted illegally by dictatorial governments, or illegally by
non-authorized parties. The individual right to privacy is in-
alienable as recalled by the UN Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
many other international and regional treaties.
III. DIGITAL FORENSICS AND ANONYMITY: A
STATE-OF-THE-ART
Items of digital media are more easily modifiable than tradi-
tional media. Due to the revolutions of personal computers and
the Internet, digital media is now of widespread use and can
be found everywhere. Various media manipulation programs
have been developed over the last decades, and they have been
progressively simplified and are now accessible to everyone.
These programs and afferent consequences have necessitated
the emergence of digital forensics, a new discipline that
flows initially from the need to address the challenges arising
from digital media manipulation. An important goal of this
recent discipline is to (in)validate the authenticity or integrity
of media, and it usually tries to answer the two following
questions [15]. Firstly, “Who were the media producers?”
Secondly, “Has the media been manipulated, is it faked?”
Most of the multimedia forensics tools that try to addess
these questions work on the data themselves, as removing
the bullet-scratch of manipulation or creation is most of
the time a difficult signal processing task only accessible to
experts [16]. In usual forensics frameworks, statistical signal
processing analysis is combined with information available
through metadata, to respond to these kind of questions [17].
The best known software in forensic investigation, which
is nowadays a common law enforcement area, is maybe
Fig. 1. Higinio’s girlfriend (with GPS coordinates)
EnCase [14], already referred to in this document. Another
well known tool is called COFEE (Computer Online Forensic
Evidence Extractor [18]), a software program developed by
Microsoft to conduct forensic investigations, which became
famous when it was leaked on the Internet in November
2009. Microsoft provides devices and free technical support to
law enforcement agencies all around the world. Although the
majority of forensic software is closed-source and expensive,
some others are free, like the DEFT3 or CAINE4, SLEUTH5,
and so on.
Oddly, the converse problem, namely metadata anonymiza-
tion, is not a well studied area of research in digital foren-
sics. The little that has been investigated is about volunteer
anonymization, which happens at the attacker side. For in-
stance, Symantec has explored metadata anonymization for
file system images [19], following an approach described
below. Symantec has its own file system called VxFS. An
interesting feature of this file system is its ability to take a
snapshot of metadata (no user data is retained), for forensic
analysis purposes, debugging, or troubleshooting. If privacy is
an important concern of the client, they can demand metadata
anonymization: all folder and file names will be hashed with
the SHA-1 function. Doing so is space and time efficient, and
maintains the file system integrity (the output of SHA-1 has a
fixed length, so if the computed hash is too lengthy, characters
3http://deftlinux.net - DEFT is a GNU/Linux liveCD running Windows
forensic freeware using Wine
4http://caine-live.net - A GNU/Linux forensic liveCD
5http://sleuthkit.org - A Free library and collection of tools to investigate
disk images.
are removed, whereas it is simply processed by segment
if this latter is too short). Obviously, this rather simplistic
approach can easily be bypassed, but it prevents unintentional
information leaks. For Internet exchanges, the network utility
Wireshark allows an anonymization of network packets, whose
headers can contain information about the transmitter and the
receiver. For more information, the reader is referred to [20]
and the references therein.
One can regret the relative absence of tools and research
in the specific field of user’s metadata anonymization. This
has been an important motivation to develop the MAT toolkit.
However, among the very few publications about metadata
anonymization, some significant research can be highlighted.
One of the most interesting papers concerns the risks and
countermeasures for PDF publication files [21]. Although
the approach focuses on Adobe Acrobat Professional, this
article explores a wide-range of potential attack vectors related
to metadata, and associated counter-measures. The national
library of New Zealand has also developed a tool called
the “Metadata Extraction Tool [22]” to obtain metadata from
various document formats, in order to automatically perform
analysis or classification on them. It is entirely written in Java,
and released under the terms of the Apache license.
Anti-forensic measures have not yet been largely investi-
gated. Almost all public tools are too simplistic, when not
completely broken. But some are worth being mentioned like
the MAFIA (Metasploit Anti-Forensic Investigation Arsenal),
which provides a suite of efficient tools, like Timestomp
(NTFS timestamps removal). Unfortunately, these tools are far
too complex for the non-technical user.
IV. INVESTIGATING METADATA
A. Different types of metadata
Items of metadata are of different kinds, depending on the
way they are produced. To have a clear understanding of their
composition, we propose the following classifications.
1) The contextual type: Physical or logical devices that pro-
duce documents usually insert metadata into these produced
files, mostly in order to enrich them. For instance, authors and
software names are embedded in Office documents, whereas
author, interpreter, composer, and track number are usually
inserted into multimedia data. They are not added to identify
the user or producer, but still compromise their privacy. These
types of metadata are generally documented, or can be easily
obtained by reverse engineering. We will show that the MAT
can handle them in most cases.
2) The watermark type: Some multimedia files embed a
watermark directly in their data, usually for copyright reasons.
If this data reveals no information about the user, it is
categorized into this “watermark type”. The authors are not
aware of any case when information susceptible to revealling
the users identity was embedded as a watermark
3) The fingerprinting type: For transmission of confidential
documents, fingerprinting metadata (also known as a tattoos)
is often embedded inside the document, to enable traceing
back an eventual leaker. Contrary to the watermark type, this
Type Extension Support Metadata Removal method Remaining Metadata
Portable Hachoir
Network .png Full Textual metadata + date or ExifTool when available None
Graphics
Jpeg6 Jpeg .jpeg, .jpg Partial Comment + exif/photoshop/adobe Hachoir or ExifTool if available Canon Raw tags
Open Document .odt, .odx, .ods, ... Full A meta.xml file contains all metadata Removal of the meta.xml file None
Office Openxml .docx, .pptx, .xlsx, ... Full A docProps folder containing Removal of the docProps folder Nonexml metadata files
.pdf Full A lot
Rendering of the PDF file on a None
Portable cairo surface with the help of
Document poppler, exporting the surface as
Fileformat a PDF. Metadata added during
the process is removed with
python-pdfrw.
Tape ARchive .tar, .tar.bz2, .tar.gz Full
Tar metadata, metadata from Extracting and processing
Nonecompressed files themselves, each file, recompressionmetadata added by archive in a new archive, processing
to compressed files. of the new archive.
Zip .zip Partial
Zip metadata, metadata from Extractiing and processing of Metadata added
compressed files themselves, each file, recompression in by zip itself
metadata added by archive a new archive, processing into internal files
to compressed files. of the new archive.
MPEG Audio .mp3, .mp2, Full id3 Hachoir None.mp1, .mpa or Mutagen when available
Ogg .ogg Full Vorbis Hachoir None
Vorbis or Mutagen when available
Free Lossless .flac Full Flac Mutagen None
Audio Codec Vorbis
TABLE II
SUPPORTED FILE FORMATS
metadata potentially reveals some information about the file
user. Due to its final purpose, this type of metadata is really
difficult to detect and even more difficult to remove without
breaking file integrity. There are two sorts of fingerprinting
metadata: robust, and fragile.
a) Robust fingerprinting: The goal of robust finger-
printing is to insert hidden information that resists content
modification such as format conversion or resizing. Robust
fingerprinting is usually designed to be only removable by
modifying the content enough that it becomes completely
unusable.
b) Fragile fingerprinting: The fragile type of fingerprint-
ing is usually used to guarantee the integrity of a document.
The slightest modification of the file will break the watermark.
The goal is to prove that the file has not been altered or
modified.
Most of the proposed fingerprint removal solutions require
a large database of watermarked/non-watermarked files. They
imply complex statistical signal processing methods coupled
with artificial intelligence tools like massive fine-tuned learn-
ing machines.
The removal of a fingerprint from a single document remains
an open problem, which is out of the scope of this paper.
V. THREAT MODEL
The Metadata Anonymisation Toolkit adversary has a num-
ber of goals, capabilities, and counter-attack types that can be
used to guide us towards a set of requirements for the MAT.
A. Adversary
1) Goals:
• Identifying the source of the document, since a document
always has one. Who/where/when/how was a picture
taken, where was the document leaked from and by
whom, . . .
• Identify the author; in some cases documents may be
anonymously authored or created. In these cases, identi-
fying the author is the goal.
• Identify the equipment/software used. If the attacker fails
to directly identify the author and/or source, his next
goal is to determine the source of the equipment used
to produce, copy, and transmit the document. This can
include the model of camera used to take a photo, or
which software was used to produce an office document.
2) Positioning:
• The adversary created the document specifically for this
user. This is the strongest position for the adversary to
have. In this case, the adversary is capable of inserting
arbitrary, custom watermarks specifically for tracking
the user. In general, MAT cannot defend against this
adversary, but we list it for completeness.
• The adversary created the document for a group of users.
In this case, the adversary knows that they attempted to
limit distribution to a specific group of users. They may
or may not have watermarked the document for these
users, but they certainly know the format used.
• The adversary did not create the document, the weakest
position for the adversary to have. The file format is (most
of the time) standard, nothing custom is added: MAT
should be able to remove all meta-information from the
file.
B. Requirements
1) Processing:
• The MAT should avoid interactions with information.
Its goal is to remove metadata, and the user is solely
responsible for the information of the file.
• The MAT must warn when encountering an unknown
format. For example, in a zipfile, if MAT encounters an
unknown format, it should warn the user, and ask if the
file should be added to the anonymized archive that is
produced.
• The MAT must not add metadata, since its purpose is to
anonymize files: every added items of metadata decreases
anonymity.
• The MAT must handle unknown/hidden metadata fields,
like proprietary extensions of open formats.
VI. PRIVACY AND ANONYMITY POLICY IMPLEMENTED IN
THE MAT
A. Technical aspects
MAT stands for Metadata Anonymization Toolkit. It is
designed to improve anonymity of files published online. It
consists of an extensible library, a Command Line Interface
(CLI), and a Graphic User Interface (GUI). The MAT suite
aims at providing, within the reach of anyone, software
dedicated to listing and removing metadata; for portability
purposes, it is entirely written in Python [23], and is based
on the Hachoir library [24].
B. Security and anonymity policy
To offer a reliable tool for metadata removal, one must first
determine criteria to decide whether a given field must be
considered harmful or not. This raises the question of choosing
a security and anonymity policy. The strategy used by the MAT
is to process all the metadata that can be removed: any piece
of the file that (1) is not a data, and (2) can be removed, is
considered as a threat and so is deleted.
This may seems rough, but it appears to the author of MAT
as the best solution: categorizing any possible metadata of
every handled format is, on the one hand, very subjective (for
instance, is the gid field of a file a compromising metadata?),
and on the other hand it is an intractable task in practice.
Additionally, doing so leaves the least possible amount of
metadata to the attacker. Even if the absence of any metadata
also provides information, the quantity of information leaked
by this absence is obviously lower than the quantity provided
by remaining metadata.
C. White list approach
Since the MAT handles “usual” file formats, they are often
documented ones, even in the case of closed formats. Thus, a
white list approach is possible. Because the format structure
is known, each unknown field is a non-standard one that can
be safely removed without breaking the file integrity.
A counterpart of this approach is that some information loss
may occur if the file is not well-documented, or if it has been
saved using a non standard extension. For example, Adobe use
their own extension for PDFs. So files produced with Adobe
products, processed by the MAT, and finally read with any
Adobe products, may lose information during this process.
Unfortunately, some closed formats are too complex to be
completely understood by a reverse engineering study, and so
the MAT library cannot handle them. This is the case for the
Microsoft Office pre-2003 formats (.doc, .ppt, and so on),
which are known to be complex and whose design is often
reported as disputable.
D. Field Anonymization
Metadata fields are suppressed whenever possible. Other-
wise, numerical data is set to 0, dates to Epoch, and strings
to an empty string. Filling fields with random values or real-
looking ones may seem to make sense. But this is a poor
strategy, as producing false data is not harmless. It requires
an ad-hoc algorithm that could be traced back to the owner or
designer of this tailored anonymizing algorithm. Additionally,
potential input data of this algorithm (seeds, PRNG parame-
ters, and so on) can accidentally leak information.
Indeed, except the cryptographically secure ones (like
ISAAC or BBS, see [25]–[28]), all the commonly used pseudo-
random number generators (PRNGs) are quite biased. Several
attacks on common PRNGs have been reported [29], making
it possible to determine the algorithm used, and even in some
cases the seed, when considering a sufficiently large sample of
pseudorandom numbers generated by an algorithm. So, using
pseudorandom values instead of empty strings may lead to
a successful forensics attack, and to the discovery of some
tools used for this anonymization, revealing information on the
user. Furthermore, a simple source code inspection could allow
an attacker to deduce all possible values that the MAT can
generate, allowing either brute force or probabilistic attacks.
Contrarily, removing everything that is possible to remove is
fairly safe.
E. Surface Rendering for PDF
The PDF format is quite complex: its specification docu-
ment is more than 1300 pages long. Furthermore major PDF
producers have developed their own extensions. This is why
such a format should be carefully cleaned part by part.
Of course, usual metadata is well documented. But this
format is so rich that it is possible to embed virtually anything
into a PDF: text, pictures, javascript, or even videos. This is
why the MAT uses a clever trick to handle PDF: rendering on
cairo’s PDF surface. The rendering process is comparable to
a print: hyperlinks are broken, videos too, invisible metadata
is removed, which drastically reduces the risk of leaking the
author’s information.
F. Supported formats and implemented features
The MAT supports most of the “usual” formats, from
pictures to Office documents (see Table II for an exhaustive
list of supported formats). Concerning archive formats (noting
that most of the Office documents are zipped XML files, and
thus these formats belong into this category), metadata mostly
exists in a simple file folder, which is easy to remove. Audio
format processing relies on Mutagen when available, and
images processing relies on Exiftool, again when available.
G. The MAT output
The MAT’s output is intentionally minimal, since it is
intended for non-technical people. The goal of the "metadata
listing" functionality is to give a global view of present
compromising metadata. Since this is the same picture as the
one studied previously, we can recognize some patterns.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper is a first step in the direction towards document
metadata processing for anonymity and privacy. Based on a
study of current trends in digital media forensics, the problem
of metadata removal has been pointed out as a potential
vulnerability. A thorough analysis of different metadata has
allowed to propose a categorization in two criteria: useful-
ness for media integrity, and anonymity and privacy threats.
Finally, technical choices and their implementation have been
presented.
Potential future improvements include dealing with finger-
prints, removing sensor “bullet scratch” from digital media,
and processing more file formats. The major short term im-
provement for the next version of the MAT is the handling of
metadata related to file-system-timestamps. New file formats
should be supported in the near future. Furthermore, until now,
the MAT is neither able to detect nor to remove fingerprints
embedded in digital media. This might not seem useful, as the
insertion of a watermark is usually a choice of user. However,
more and more camera models insert, in every captured image,
a fingerprint which identifies camera brand and model (see [9],
[10] and therein references).
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